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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ! 
V • i 
CLINTON PERANK, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. ; 
> Supreme Court No. 860243 
1 Priority 2 
REPLY BRIEF OP RESPONDENT 
STATE OP UTAH 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent State of Utah, pursuant to an Order of this Court 
dated November 10, 1987, submits this Brief in response to the 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Ute Indian Tribe, filed on July 21, 1988. 
On August 7, 1987, the State filed with this Court a motion 
suggesting the Court invite the Ute Tribe to give its views on 
the reservation boundary issue in this case. Since a deter-
mination of the boundary issue could affect the Tribe and its 
members, it seemed proper for the Tribe to be allowed an oppor-
tunity to express its views on that matter. On October 7, 1987, 
this Court granted the Statefs motion and invited the Tribe to 
file an amicus curiae brief. 
1 
Rather than addressing the central issue in this c a s e — 
whether the Uintah Valley Reservation boundaries have been dimin-
ished—the Tribe chose to ignore the boundary issue in its brief, 
and commented only on the secondary issue of whether or not 
Appellant Perank was an Indiai i Th i s :i s puzzling : light of the 
importance of the boundary issue to the Tribe and its members. 
In any event, for the reasons stated below, the Tribe is incor-
rect in its analysis of Mr. Perank's status as an Indian. 
ARGUMENT 
1. In i f !•; b r i e 1: , t h e * I' i ;i I»e c h a r a c t e r i z e s + 11 e> i s s u fj o f 
whether or not Appellant was an Indian as the "threshold" issue 
in this case (Tribefs Brief at p. 1 ) . Not so 18 U.S.C. Sec-
tions 1152 and 1153 preclude State criini i Ia 1 ji iri sdi ction over 
"Indians" who commit crimes within Indian Country. Thus, in 
order to divest the Utah Courts of jurisdiction, Appellant must 
show that the crime was committed in Indian Country and that he 
held the legal status of an Indian. Neither of those require-
ments is a "threshold" issue to the other. Appellant simply must 
carry his burden on both. Perankfs Indian status is really not a 
controverted issue on appeal because Perank seems to have carried 
his burden of proof oi I i lis Indian status (whi ch w m* r ^tunately 
unrebutted in the record below). In our view, the primary con-
troverted issue in this case is whether or not the crime was 
2 
committed within "Indian Country11-—an i .isue the Tribe has chosen 
to ignore. 
In our primary brief we took the position that Appellant 
had 1 hp burden of establishing his legal status as an Indian for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. J152 and 115., liMdiik ubmitt^d ome 
evidence supporting his claim to Indian status- The State 
presented n > evidence tc the contrary
 r irid " [g]iven the state of 
the record it cannot be said that Perank!s status as an Indian 
. . was not established below" (see Respondent's Primary Brief 
at p. £ -i . 
In light of the Tribe!s erroneous assertions, some histori-
cal elaboration on Perankfs Indian status is appropriate. Both 
the record and case law would seem to establish Ptiank" «* , »if-, 
as an Indian. Even though Perank was not an enrolled tribal 
member at t hf„. * jnie c.r the offense, ne was entitled to be enrolled 
under the Ute Tribal Constitution (and, as will be shown btb.w, 
has since been enrolled). 
As a factual matter, P , Perank nhniitttd affidavits at his 
probation revocation hearing from his father and mother (R. 6 9-
72) which stated that Perank!s father is a full-blooded Ute 
Indian and an enrolled membti ol trie n e Tribe, unci the l Perank 
was born in Roosevelt while his family was residing on the 
reservation ^he record also contains a copy of Perankfs birth 
3 
certificate (R. 76), and those of other Perank family members 
(R. 73-75). 
Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution—which was in 
effect at the time of the offense—provided that the membership 
of the Ute Indian Tribe included: 
All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a resident 
of the Reservation at the time of the birth of said 
children.^ 
Perank fits tl ie mo3 d. The affidavits and birth certificates in 
the record (R. 69-76) demonstrate that Perank was the son of an 
enrolled member of the Ute Tribe (his father) who was residing on 
the reservation at the time of Perank1 . . Under the Ti ib^!s 
Constitution Perank was deemed to be a tribal member from birth, 
but was not formally enrolled because of a misinterpretation of 
the Tribal Constitution by the Tribal Business Coniiuittee. 
Despite the above-quoted provision of the Ute Tribal Constitu-
tion, flu- Tribal Business Committee attempted to limit tribal 
enrollment to those persons possessing a quantum of at least 
5/8ths Ute blood. These policies were begun in the mid-1950!s 
1
 A copy of Article II of the Tribal Constitution is at-
tached hereto as Appendix A. The Court can take judicial notice 
of that document under Rule 201(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. It 
should be noted that after Perank was enrolled, this part of the 
Constitution was amended to include a 5/8ths blood quantum 
requirement. 
4 
after the so-called "Mixed-Bloods" were terminated as tribal 
members by an Act of Congress (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa). 
In 1977, lawsuits were filed in Ute Tribal Court on behalf 
of various children of enrolled tribal members who had been 
denied enrollment by the Tribal Business Committee because they 
did not possess the 5/8ths quantum of Ute blood. The plaintiffs 
claimed they were entitled to tribal membership under the above-
quoted section of Article II of the Tribal Constitution regard-
less of blood quantum. In Chapoose, et al., v. Ute Indian Tribe, 
et al., Tribal Court No. 133-77, the Tribal Court held that 
Article II of the Tribal Constitution did indeed control and 
define membership in the Tribe, and the Tribal Business Committee 
could not abrogate those provisions by a more restrictive or-
dinance. The Tribal Court further found the plaintiffs were 
entitled to tribal benefits retroactive to the date of their 
complaints (1977). That decision was appealed to the Tribal 
Appellate Court, which affirmed. Copies of those decisions are 
attached as Appendices B and C, respectively, for the Court's 
convenience. 
In response to the above-cited rulings of the Tribal Courts, 
the Business Committee enacted an ordinance allowing plaintiffs 
to be enrolled as tribal members, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior, acting through the B.I.A. Reservation 
5 
Superintendent (see Chapoose v. Clarkf infra). The Reservation 
Superintendent refused to approve the enrollment, relying on a 
1955 Opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior stating that in the 
1954 Termination Act (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa) Congress had 
preempted the Tribe!s authority to set membership requirements. 
Plaintiffs then sued the Secretary of the Interior in the 
United States District Court. In that action, Judge David K. 
Winder held for the plaintiffs and found the Secretary's denial 
of the enrollment "clearly wrong" on the grounds that despite the 
1954 Act, the Ute Indian Tribe retained full power to control its 
own membership and membership was to be defined by Article II of 
the Ute Tribal Constitution, Chapoose, et al., v. Clark, 607 
F.Supp. 1027, 1036-1037 (D.C. Utah, 1985).2 
Finally, in the fall of 1986, the Tribal Business Committee 
authorized enrollment of all persons in the same class as the 
plaintiffs, i.e.: "all children born to any member of the Ute 
Indian Tribe . . . who is a resident of the reservation at the 
time of the birth of said children." Perank was in the group of 
persons so enrolled. 
The Ute Tribefs brief claims that in order to qualify as an 
2 It seems clear that the Tribe and its courts have full 
authority to determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). However, the same does not hold 
true for the determination of reservation boundaries (see discus-
sion in Respondent's Primary Brief at pp. 5-8). 
6 
Indian a person must be recognized as such by the Indian com-
munity in which he or she lives. Assuming, arguendo, that is 
true, in this case the Tribe's own Constitution has recognized 
Perank as a member of the Tribe since his birth and Ute Tribal 
Courts have so held. It was only the Tribal Business Committee 
who refused to list Perank and others as tribal members until 
required to do so by its own Courts. 
Finally, the Tribe is not accurate when it attempts to 
create the impression that Perank was allowed to enroll only 
during a "window of opportunity" in October of 1986. If, as the 
record seems to indicate, Mr. Perank was the son of an enrolled 
tribal member who was residing on the reservation at the time of 
the childfs birth, the Tribal Constitution and decisions of the 
Tribal Courts state that enrollment was his birthright from his 
birth up to April 15, 1988, when the Tribe amended its Constitu-
tion to include the 5/8ths blood quantum requirement.3 
Based on the affidavits and birth certificates in the record 
and the subsequent enrollment of Mr. Perank as required by the 
Tribal Constitution, we can reach no other conclusion than we 
stated in our primary brief that ,f[g]iven the state of the record 
3
 This is further supported by the Tribal Court's ruling 
that the plaintiffs in Chapoose, et al., v. Ute Indian Tribe, et 
al., supra, were entitled to tribal royalties and other benefits 
retroactive to the filing of their Complaints in 1977. 
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it cannot be said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 
U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was not established below" (Brief 
of Respondent at 49). 
CONCLUSION 
The Tribe has had an opportunity to comment on the crucial 
issue in this case but has chosen not to do so. While the Court 
should review the record and the law relating to Mr. Perank's 
Indian statusf Respondent State of Utah cannot in good faith 
claim this is a controverted issue on appeal. The real issue is 
whether the crime was committed in "Indian Country". 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney General 
EARL F. 'DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY / / / 
Assistant Atto^aey General 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPOltoENT 
236 State Capitol Building 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH were served by mailing the 
same, first class postage prepaid, this 26th day of August, 
1988, to: 
Kirk C. Bennett 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
4059 South 4000 West 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120 
Stephen G. Boyden 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Ute Indian Tribe 
1100 South 1500 East 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
Tom D. Tobin 
422 Main Street 
WINNER SD 5758 0 
Alvin G. Nash 
Herbert W. Gillespie 
Duchesne County Courthouse 
Center & 100 South Street 
DUCHESNE UT 8 4 021 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
Duchesne & Uintah Counties 
MICHAEL 
Assistant 
M. QtiEKIft/ 
y Gutter hi 
±\rr£*i\u±A. jt\ 
I. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE 
OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION 
PREAMBLE 
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands hereafter to be known as 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in order to establish a more responsible 
tribal organization, promote the general welfare, encourage educational progress, conserve and 
develop our lands and resources, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the power to exercise 
certain rights of home rule, not inconsistent with the Federal , State and local laws, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
Article I — Territory 
The Jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Unitah and Ouray Reservation shall extend to the 
territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive 
Orders of October 3, 1861 and January 5, 1882, and by the Acts of Congress approved May 27, 1902, 
and June 19, 1902, and to such other lands without such boundaries as may hereafter be added thereto 
under any law of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law. 
Article II — Membership 
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
consist as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the offial census roll of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
who is a resident of the Reservation at the time of the birth of said children. 
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to 
review by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future membership and the adoption of new 
members. 
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost through membership in this organization except as 
provided hereing. 
Article III — The Business Committee 
Section 1. The governing body of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
be a business committee, known as the Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee. 
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall consist of six memoers, two (2) members duly 
elected from each of the three (3) bands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
known as the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands. 
Sec. 3. The members of the Tribal Business Committe shall be elected for a term of four (4) years, 
except at the first election, when one (1) member from each band shall be elected for a term of two (2) 
years; thereafter, their successors shall be elected for a term of four (4) years. 
Sec. 4. The Tribal Business Committee, so organized, shall elect from within its own number (1) a 
chairman, (2) a vice-chairman; and from within or without, (3) a secretary, and (4) a treasurer, and 
such other officials and committees as may be deemed necessary. 
Sec. 5. Tne first election of the Tribal Business Committee hereunder shall be called, held and 
supervised by the present Tribal Business Committee within sixty (60) days after the ratification and 
approval of this Constitution. 
Tne candidate from each band receiving the highest number of votes shall hold office for a term of 
four (4) years, and the candidate from each band receiving the next highest number of votes shall hold 
office for two (2) years; thereafter, even' two (2) years a Tribal Business Committeeman shall be 
elected from each band to represent such bands for a term of four (4) years. 
After the first election, elections for the Tribal Business Committee shall be called at least sixty 
(60) days prior to the expiration of the terms of office of the members of the Tribal Business 
Committee. 
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A P P E N D I X A 
IN THE UTE TRIBAL COURT 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPENDIX B 
HASKELL LEVI CHAPOOSE, as Guardian X 
Ad Litem for and on behalf of his minor X 
children, to-wit: Shaun Thomas X 
Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon X 
Levi Chapoose, Michell Quetta Chapoose, X 
and Connor Charles Chapoose, X 
X 
Plaintiffs, X 
X 
vs. X JUDGEMENT 
X 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND X 
OURAY RESERVATION, UINTAH AND OURAY XCivil No. 133-77 
TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, RUBY BLACK, X 
CHARLES REDFOOT, ANTONE APPAWOO, MYRON X 
ACCUTTOROOP, OURAY McCOOK, FLOYD X 
WOPSOCK, as members of the Uintah and X 
Ouray Tribal Business Committee, and X 
CECIL ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior X 
of the United Statesof America, $ 
X 
Defendants* X 
This matter comes on for hearing upon the Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgement. The Court, having been advised of 
the facts, which are undisputed in this matter, will dispose 
of all issues in this judgement. 
The Ute Tribal Court of the Uintah and Ouray Reservatic 
is the proper forum to hear cases affecting membership in the 
Tribe. See, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Julia Martinez, et.al.* Sup. Ct. 
76-682 published in 46 L.W. 4412 (1978), and also Friichett, et al. 
v. Vte Indian Tribe, et al.> Civil Action No. 92-77. 
The Court in Civil No. 92-77 has disposed of the 
question as to "What are the qualifications of a person to become 
a member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation?" 
APPENDIX B 
The facts in this case are as follows: 
That the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoose, is the father 
of the following children: 
1. Shaun Thomas Chapoose, born on April 23, 1967; 
2. JaNae Lyn Chapoose, born on March 15, 1969; 
3. Dixon Levi Chapoose, born on February 24, 1971; 
4. Michelle Quetta Chapoose, born on April 30, 1973; 
5. Connor Charles Chapoose, born on November 13, 197 6. 
That Haskell Levi Chapoose was born on August 30, 194 0 
at Fort Duchesne, Utah and he was listed as member No. 199 in the 
list of full-blood in the Federal Register on April 5, 1956; he 
having been born to Connor Chapoose and Lulu Wass, both of whom 
were full-bloods; that he married Sherrie L. Dixon on Sept. 3, 1966, 
and since that time they have been and now are husband and wife; 
that he and his wife resided upon the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
at the time each of his children above named were born. 
That thereafter, the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoose, 
made application to the Tribal Business Committee of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation requesting that each of said children be 
admitted to membership, and said applications were denied on 
June 2, 1977. 
The Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe 
provide: 
,fArticle II — MEMBERSHIP: 
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall consist 
as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear 
on the official census roll of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 
1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a 
resident of the Reservation at the time of the birth 
of said children. 
Section 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have 
the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to review 
by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future 
membership and the adoption of new members. 
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost 
through membership in this organization except as 
provided herein." 
The Constitution and By-laws also provide in Article 
VI — POWERS OF THE TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, as follows: 
"Section 1. Enumerated Powers. — The Tribal Business 
Committee of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
exercise the following powers, subject to any limi-
tations imposed by the statutes or the Constitution 
of the United States, and subject further to all ex-
press restrictions upon such powers contained in this 
Constitution and By-laws, and subject to review by the 
Ute Bands themselves at any annual or special meeting: . . 
(j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not inconsis-
tent with Article II of this Constitution governing 
adoption and abandonment of members, and to keep at 
all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation." 
And Article X — AMENDMENTS, states as follows: 
"Amendments to the Constitution and By-laws may be 
ratified and approved in the same manner as this Con-
stitution and By-laws. Whenever the Tribal Business 
Committee shall, by an affirmative vote of four or 
more members, call for the submission of an amendment, 
the Secretary of the Interior shall call an election 
upon the proposed amendment. If at such election the" 
amendment is adopted by a majority of the qualified 
voters of the Tribe voting thereon and if at least 
thirty (3D) per cent of those entitled to vote shall 
vote in such election, such amendment shall be sub-
mitted to the Secretary of the Interior and if approved 
by him, shall thereupon take effect." 
Pursuant to Article II, Section 2, in 1958 the Tribal 
Business Committee passed Ordinance No. 0-58-1 dated September 17 
1958, as follows: 
"WHEREAS, much confusion has resulted on enrollment appli-
cations received on behalf of children born to parents, 
one of which is Ure Indian and the other either non-
Indian or an Indian of another Tribe; and, 
WHEREAS, the applications are becoming more frequent 
and the spirit of Public Law 671 (68 Stat. 8 68) "is not 
being carried out.by enrollment of children of 1/2 
degree Ute Indian blood; and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of Ute Indians to further restrict 
enrollment with the Ute Indian Tribe to prevent 
reoccurence of a condition of many mixed-bloods on the rolls 
as was the case before the enactment of Public Law 671; 
and, 
WHEREAS, it is deemed to the best interest of the Ute 
Indian Tribe to so restrict further enrollment; and, 
WHEREAS, under Article II, Section 2.of the Constitution 
of the Ute Indian Tribe, the Tribal Business 
Committee is empowered to promulgate ordin-
I ances subject to review by the Secretary of 
I the Interior covering future membership and 
I the adoption of new members, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT ENACTED BY THE UINTAH AND 
OURAY TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE that hereafter 
no person born subsequent to the adoption of 
this Ordinance shall be enrolled in the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation unless the degree of Ute Indian blood 
of such person is five-eighth (5/8) or more. 
Ute Indian blood as construed in this ordin-
ance shall mean Ute Indian blood of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation, Utah.1' 
And the Tribal Business Committee on July 26, 1950 
passed the following Ordinance which reads in part: 
I "Defining 'Indian blood' for the purposes of 
future membership. Be it enacted subject to 
review of the Secretary of the Interior that 
hereafter for purposes of determining member-
ship in the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation all Indian blood pos-
sessed by persons whose names appear on the 
census roll of July 1, 1935 shall be deemed 
I to be Ute Indian blood.11 
Counsel for the plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 
I the provisions of Public Law 90-284 passed April 11, 1968 commonly 
li knows as the ICRA. 
THE COURT FINDS that Section 1(b) of Article II of the 
I Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
I Ouray Reservation applies in this case since one parent was a mem-
jl ber of the Tribe at the time of the birth of said children they 
t 
lj |. are therefore entitled to be enrolled to membership in the Ute 
{I 
I Indian Tribe. 
I 
li The Court notes that Section 1(b) of Article II provides 
ji 
i for birth of children to any member (in the singular), and if said 
U 
|j parent resides on the reservation at the time of the birth of the 
i 
I child, only one parent need be a member of the Tribe. No amend-
jjments have been made to the Constitution and By-laws as provided 
iby Article X, 
The Constitution is the primary law of the reservation 
and in any situation where the same conflicts with an ordinance, 
I the ordinance shall yield and the Constitution shall take preced-
ence. This does not mean that said Ordinance No. 0-58-1, at the 
[idate of the commencement of this action, was null and void in all 
situations, but only as to those parts which conflict with the 
Constitution itself. If the Tribal Business Committee desires to 
(amend, there is provision for the amendment to be followed by the 
IJBusiness Committee in Article X above mentioned. 
Counsel for the defendants has urged consideration of 
Amended Enrollment Ordinance No. 78-8 of March 13, 1978 and Ordin-
ance No. 78-9 (which made some minor amendments to_Ordinance No. 
I 78-9) as superseding Ordinance No. 0-58-1 of September 17, 1958. 
i 
(I This can not nullify the cause of action which accrued on June 2, 
i 
j1977. 
There are many points of law raised by counsel concernin 
the issues in this case which this Court feels are not persuasive 
and are irrelevant. Therefore the Court will not respond thereto. 
THE COURT THEREFORE FINDS that the following children of 
Kaskell Levi Chapoose should be enrolled as members in good stand-
ing of the Ute Indian Tribe as of June 2, 1977: 
SHAUN THOMAS CHAPOOSE, born on April 23, 19 67; 
JANAE LYN CHAPOOSE, born on March 15, 1969; 
DIXON LEVI CHAPOOSE, born on February 24, 1971; 
MICHELLE QUETTA CHAPOOSE, born on April 30, 1973; 
CONNOR CHARLES CHAPOOSE, born on November 13, 197 6. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Tribal Business Committee is hereby enjoined to deny membership ir 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation to the 
above named children of Haskell Levi Chapoose, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants forthwith 
cause the plaintiff's childrens names to be added to the census 
rolls of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
and cause the Finance Officer of the Ute Indian Tribe to pay to 
Haskell Levi Chapoose, as the natural guardian of said children, 
all dividends or other benefits related to Tribal Membership 
together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from 
the date said payments should have been made to this date covering 
all payments due after June 2, 1977. 
Court costs are assessed against the Tribal Business 
Committee, 
DATED this jjO fey of October, 1979, 
BY THE COTOT: 
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SCOTT C. PUGSLEY of BOYDEN, KENNEDY, & ROMNEY, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
WOODROW B. SNEED of Seneca Associates, Washington, D.C., argued the cause for 
Appellant in Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78, and for Respondents in Numbers 
10-78 and 12-78. 
GEORGE E. MANGAN of MANGAN & GILLESPIE, Roosevelt, Utah, argued the cause 
for Respondents in Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78, and for Appellants in 
Numbers 10-78 and 12-78. Herbert Wm. Gillespie with him on the briefs. 
Justice l.yasket delivered the Opinion of the Court in which he is joined by 
Justice Dupuis. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
Wyasket, J. These cases involve attempts by enrolled members of the Tribe to 
secure the enrollment of their children. Each of the Plaintiffs below had 
applied to the Tribal Business Committee on behalf of their minor children for 
the enrollment of those children. The Tribal Business Committee denied each 
of the applications on the grounds that the children did not meet the 5/B Ute 
blood quantum requirement in the enrollment ordinance in force at the time of 
the application. 
CIV No. 133-77 
CIV No. 9-78 
CIV No. 11-78 
CIV No. 10-78 
CIV No. 12-78 
APPENDIX C 
Follov/ing the denial of the enrollment applications, Plaintiffs filed 
individual actions in the Ute Tribal Court.in the nature of Mandamus requesting 
an order requiring the enrollment of their children. Named as defendants in thos 
actions were the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, the Uintah and 
Ouray Tribal Business Committee in their personal and official capacities, and 
the Secretary of the Interior as a representative of the United States. In a 
letter to the Tribal Court dated June 2, 1978, the United States Department of 
Justice protested the naming of the Secretary of the Interior as a party defendan 
The Tribal defendants moved the trial court to dismiss. 
The Tribal Court, the Honorable George Armstrong presiding, granted the 
motion to dismiss defendants Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and 
the members of the Tribal Business Committee in their individual capacities on 
October 4, 1978. The motion to dismiss was denied as to the Uintah and Ouray 
Tribal Business Committee and the individual members thereof in their official 
capacities. No formal motion having been filed urging dismissal of the Secretary 
of the Interior, the Secretary was not dismissed, and the Secretary has not 
appealed. 
While this Court recognized the principle of international law that one 
Nation does not generally have jurisdiction in its courts over another Nation 
without its consent, this Court is not accustomed to trying cases by letter. 
Simple, straightforward, and commonly recognized procedures are available to 
any party defendant who believes they have been improperly brought before the 
Courts of the Ute Tribe. The Ute Tribe has always complied with the procedural 
rules of the courts of the United States and the several States in raising 
such issves, and this Court knows of no reason that extending such a courtesy 
to the Ute Tribe would cause an undue hardship to a. great nation like the 
United States. 
the reservation at the time of the birth of their children, and the cases were 
submitted on defendant's motions for summary judgment on the stipulated facts. 
The Tribal Court, on October 30, 1979, granted judgment to Plaintiffs in Civil 
Numbers 133-77 (Haskell Levi CHAPOOSE), 9-78 (GARCIA), and 11-78 (REEDO, and 
dismissed the.actions in Civil Numbers 10-78 (E. Maxie CHAPOOSE), and 12-78 
(WOPSQCK) on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to those 
claims. The Tribal Business Committee brought this timely appeal from the 
judgment in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78, and 11-78. On December 13, 1979, 
Plaintiffs in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78 filed notices of appeal, and 
Respondents in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 filed cross appeals. The 
Tribal Business Committee has moved to dismiss the appeals and cross appeals by 
all Plaintiffs below. At oral argument on March 6, 1980, Civil Numbers 133-77, 
9-78 and 11-78 were joined for appeal, and the Court hereby consolidates and 
joins Civil lumbers 10-78 and 12-78 with these cases for decision herein^ For 
the sake of clarity, the parties will be referred to by their designations in 
the Tribal Court. 
I. 
The initial determination to be made by this Court i.s whether the appeals 
in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78, and the cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 
9-78 and 11-78 can stand in the face of the defendant's motions to dismiss. 
Defendant arpues that the twenty day time limit prescribed in Rule 37(c) of the 
Ute Indian Rules of Civil Procedure for the filing of the notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional and dispositive of the appeals and cross appeals'filed by Plainti 
In pertinent part, Rule 37(c) U.I.R.C.P. states: 
C) Time; Notice of Appeal. Within 20 dzys from the entry of 
the order of (sic) judgment appealed from the party taking the 
apoeal must file with the trial court a written notice of appeal 
specifying the parties to the appeal, the order or judgment appealed 
from, and a short statement of the reason or grounds for the appeal . 
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including subsection (c) none of which are jurisdict ional by the i r terms. 
Compliance with some subsections is clearly within the exclusive province 
of appellants while other provisions depend upon the diligence of. court 
personnel and respondents for compliance. Because holding compliance in toto 
with Rule 37 jur isd ic t ional would submit an aggrieved par t ies 1 appeal to 
possible failure due to causes outside his control, v/e are loath to do so. 
However, the orderly administration of justice requires that a t some 
point final orders and judgments of the Tribal Court must no longer be subject 
to appeal. In other words, t he r e must be a definative occurrence upon which a 
judgnent not void ab in i t i o must be considered res judicata as"against any attack 
In the absence of a defini te occurrence easily ascertainable by any person, the 
par t ies , public, and governmental off ic ia ls could never be sure when-a final ordei 
or judgment of the Tribal Court could be relied upon. 
I t is also clear from the language of the statute that the l eg i s l a t i ve 
intent is to l imit appeals to cases wherein a notice of appeal i s f i led within 
the prescribed time l imi t . We, therefore, hold that the time l imitat ion of 20 
days for fi l ing an original notice of intent to appeal found in U.I.R.C.P. Rule 
37(c) is jur isdict ional and accordingly, the appeals in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 
12-78 must be and are hereby dismissed. 
However, once the order or judgnent has come under attack by appeal, simple 
fairness indicates that the respondent be given an opportunity to rai^e those 
portions of that order or judgment by which he deems himself aggrieved'. This 
Court recognizes tha t in many cases a party may be aggrieved by a portion of an 
order or judgment of the Tribal Court but may not wish to undertake the cost ly 
and time consuming process of an appeal. Once a judgment has been brought under 
attack and the respondent brought before th is Court, the Court in- the absence 
cf a clear l eg is la t ive expression t o the contrary views a cross appeal as being 
in - the-nature-of.a counterclaim. 
•A 
Rule 37(b) U.I.R.C.P. clearly indicates that a respondent wno i> 
aggrieved by a portion of any final order, commitment, or judgment of the 
trial court has a right to appeal. However, Rule 37 does not clearly indicate 
the procedures to be followed on such a cross appeal. In the absence of 
legislative direction by the Tribal Business Committee as to the proper pro-
cedures for cross appeals, we today announce the following rules for taking 
cross appeals by respondents. Within twenty days of the filing of appellants 
notice of appeal, which time period shall be jurisdictional, respondent may 
file a notice of cross appeal with the trial court in the same manner as notices 
of appeal are filed. Respondent shall brief all issued raised in his cross 
appeal in his reply brief. Appellant shall then have 20 days after receipt of 
respondent's brief, memorandum or statement in which to reply to the new issues 
raised by the cross appeal. Cross appeals shall otherwise proceed as provided 
in Rule 37 U.I.R.C.P. In the interest of justice the time limitation on filing 
cross, appeals announced herein shall have prospective application only, and 
Plaintiffs cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 will be 
considered by this Court. Defendants motion to dismiss these cross appeals is 
accordingly denied. 
II. 
Defendants first assignment of error is that the Tribal Business Committee 
and its members while acting in their official capacity are immune from suit 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the court below erred in 
failing to dismiss. In support of this proposition, Defendants cite, inter alia, 
U.L.O.C. § 1-2-7, § 1-8-5 and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S: A9 (1978). Plaintiffs reply that mandan 
is always an appropriate remedy for illegal actions of governmental officials evf 
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25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq., constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign .immunity 
in the tribal courts, and also cite the Santa Clara Pueblo decision in support 
of their position. 
The question of jurisdiction whether raised in a state or federal court or 
this Court is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and is especially so 
when the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of this Court 
involves the basic nature of tribal government and the interrelationship of its 
parts to one another. It is, however, a question which we are called upon, and 
which it is our duty to decide*. In the words of the famous jurist Justice John 
Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 I.Ed. 257, 291: 
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should 
not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. 
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it 
approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by 
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, 
a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. 
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would 
be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly 
avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best 
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. 
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The decision in Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, stands for the proposition 
that an Indian"tribe, as a tribe, is immune from suit in the federal courts 
absent an explicit and unequivocal waiver of that immunity by Congress, and 
that no such waiver is to be implied. See, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 58-59. 
We agree. Furthermore, the Court held that, as an individual officer of the 
Pueblo, Governor Lucario Padilla was not protected by the tribe's'immunity 
from suit. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 59. The issue in Santa Clara Pueblo the, 
became whether the Indian Civil Rights Act created an implied cause of action 
against an individual in the federal courts, and the* court held that it did not. 
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that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is inherently 
entitled to sovereign immunity. Accord, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra. However, 
the issue to be decided herein is not whether the Tribe is immune from suit, 
but whether the Tribal Business Committee and its members in their official 
capacities are immune from suit in a mandamus action to enforce an alleged 
constitutional right. 
The Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservatior 
is the organic and fundamental law of this Tribe which lays the basic principles 
to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, conferr 
ing authority upon certain branches of that government limiting the exercise of 
governmental powers, and guaranteeing certain individual rights. Within that 
Constitution, the enumerated powers of the Tribal Business Committee encompass, 
inter alia, the legislative, executive, administrative, ministerial, and economic 
"functions of the tribe. 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 (K) of the Constitution, this Court has 
been conferred general jurisdiction over all civil causes of action by U.L.O.C. 
Section 1-2-5 which provides in pertinent part: 
Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained 
in either federal law, or the Tribal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute 
Tribe shall have jurisdiction over all civil CBUSBS of action . . . 
In addition to this grant of general jurisdiction, the authority of the Ute Coui 
to issue extraordinary writs is recognized by statute. A Writ of Mandamus is si 
an extraordinary writ, and its issuance is authorized by U.I.R.C.P. Rule 35 (a) 
which states: 
a) Grounds for Relief. Where no other plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy exists, relief may be obtained by obtaining an extraordinary 
writ which may be granted for any one of the "following grounds: 
i) . . . . 
2) . . . . 
3) Where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, 
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enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; 
or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment 
of a right or office to which he is entitled and from which he 
is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal, board, or 
person; or 
4) . . . . 
While U.L.O.C. 5 1-2-7 provides that whatever immunity the tribe, its officers, 
or employees may have is not waived by the general grant of jurisdiction contained 
therein, its application here begs the question. The question is whether, and to 
what extent the defendants are immune from suit under the Constitution and Code 
of the Tribe of tne common law. Turning first to the Tribal code, v/e find that 
the only provision of the Ute Constitution or Law and Order Code specifically 
establishes the defense of sovereign .immunity which has been brought to the 
attention of this Court is found at U.L.O.C. § 1-8-5. This section states that, 
"The Ute Tribe shall be immune from suit in any civil action", and tribal officers 
shall be immune from lrany liability arising from the performance of their official 
duties." Apparently, there are as many definitions of "liability" as there are 
cases wherein courts have seen fit to define the term. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 
at 1059 (Revised Fourth Edition 1958) (West Publishing Co.) and cases cited 
therein. However* the distinction drawn between the immunity from "any civil 
action" and "any liability" in this statute persuades this Court that the immunity 
granted to rribal officers and employees is not intended to be immunity from Lny 
civil action, but is intended to provide immunity from personal liability in the 
sense of payment of damages or property from personal assets for alleged injuries 
arising from the performance of the official duties of those officers and employee 
This Court can find no authority, and counsel have directed it to none, 
which specifically grants the Tribal Business Committee an exception in the form 
of a sovereign immunity defense, such as granted the tribe in U.L.O.C. § 1-2-5. 
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ne general rule is that a., express exception to an othe. ,se unqudimcu 
authority precludes the establishment of other and different exceptions by 
implication. See, Massachusetts Trustees of East. G. and F, Assoc, v. United 
States, 312 F. 2d.-214, 222 {1st Cir. 1953); "We believe.that;limitations 
upon an otherwise general grant of power should not lightly be inferred.!' In 
the words of the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States 
v. Jones, 567 F. 2d. 965, 967 (10th Cir. 1977): 
As a general principle of statutory construction, if a statute 
specifies one exception to the general application, other exceptions 
are excluded: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
Vie are, however, reluctant to adopt so wide a rule, and, for public policy 
reasons, in this case decline to do so. From the foregoing discussion, it is 
sufficient to state that the Constitution and statutes of the Ute Tribe nowhere 
.specifically provide immunity for these defendants in the instant case. We are, 
therefore, compelled to consider whether the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity applies so as to bar this action. 
Defendants cite Duoan'v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 10 L.Ed. 2d. 15, 23 (196: 
for the proposition that: 
The general rule is that'a suit is against the sovereign if "the 
judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, 
or interfere with the public administration," or if the effect of the 
judgment would be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel 
it to act". (citations omitted). 
While this proposition is attractive at face value,*the United States Supreme 
Court in Dugan also recognized two distinct exceptions to that rule:.,f(l) actio 
by officers beyond their statutory (constitutional) powers, and (2) even though 
within the scope of their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in whi 
they are exercised are constitutionally void." Dugan, supra, at 621; Hal one v. 
Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962). In attempting to analytically rationalize 
c 
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(1 Cranch) 137; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 
(1949); and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 426 U.S. 49 (1978) with this rule 
and its exceptions, it becomes readily apparent that one is caught in an 
analytical treadmill. 
In Marbury v. Madison, supra, William Marbury had been appointed as a 
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia during the waning portion of 
John Adams1 term as President of the United States. Pursuant to the statute 
then in effect, the signed commission was forwarded from the President to the 
Secretary of State's office to be sealed and recorded. Mr. Lincoln, then 
Secretary of State, and James Madison who succeeded him, refused to deliver 
the commission or a copy thereof to Marbury, and Marbury brought an action 
asking the Court to order the Secretary of State to "deliver the commission or 
a copy thereof to him as evidence of his appointment as a Justice nf the Peace. 
In its embryonic form, the issue of sovereign immunity of an agent of the Unitec 
States v/as raised by Mr. Lincoln when he objected that he was not bound by the 
Court, and ought not to answer as to any facts which came officially to his 
knowledge as Secretary of State. Marbury, supra at 143. Furthermore, the 
Secretary of*State objected that the court had no authority to compel him to 
deliver the commission. 
The Court in Marbury first considered whether the Plaintiff had a legal 
right to the commission, and determined that withholding the commission was not 
warranted by law, and violated a vested legal right of the Plaintiff. Marbury, 
supra at 162. The Court then reached the issue of whether he had a remedy for 
the breach of his vested legal right by an officer of the United States. In 
finding that it was not the office of the person sued but the nature of the act 
which determined whether the action could be maintained, the Court stated at 16 
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departments are the political or confidential agents of the execu-
tive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act 
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal 
discretion, nothing can be more.perfectly clear than that their acts 
are only .-politically examinable. But where a specific duty is 
assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance 
of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers 
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for 
a remedy. 
A cursory examination of Justice Marshall's ruling in light of the rule 
announced in Dugan, supra, would seem to indicate that the action should have 
been barred. Clearly, a mandamus issued to an official of the government 
compelling an action within his authority would be to "compel (the Government) 
to act". 
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), 
plaintiff alleged a breach of a contract of sale by the Administrator of the 
War Assets Administration, a legislatively created government agency. Plaintiff 
prayed for an injunction to prevent the Administrator from delivering the coal, 
which was the subject of the contract, to a third party, and for a declaration 
that the coal actually belonged to the plaintiff under the contract. In sub-
stance then, plaintiff's case was very similar to that of William Marbury in 
that in both cases, plaintiff sought an extraordinary writ to cure an alleged 
legal wrong. In Larson, however, the court refused to consider whether the 
contract had, in fact, been violated and ruled that the Administrator was immune 
from suit under the theory that the requested relief would "restrain the govern-
ment" from acting by ordering the Administrator not to sell or deliver the coal 
involved to anyone other than the plaintiff. Larson, supra, at 688, 639. 
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), plaintiff brought 
an action for injunctive relief against the Santa Clara Pueblo and its Governor, 
Lucario Padilla, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal ordinance which 
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words, plaintiff claimed an alleged legal wrong, and sought injunctive relief 
to restrain the government, in the form of the Governor, from continuing its 
alleged wrongdoing. In Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, the Court summarily stated 
that Governor Padilla was not irrrnune from suit. 
In all these cases there lies a common thread. Plaintiff alleges a legal 
wrong to him by a government official, plaintiff brings an action for extra-
ordinary relief to cure the wrong, and in all these cases, the official, if the 
requested relief is to be entered, must be ordered to do that which he was 
refusing to do, or to not do that which he was doing. If the rule of Duoan v. 
Rank, supra, is dispositive of such cases, it is clear that the defendant must 
be held immune in each case. However, in the Marbury and Santa Clara Pueblo 
decisions, the government official was held not" to be immune. 
The difficulty here lies in determining when and how the activities of a 
person occupying an official position in the government acts in such a manner 
that his actions are not personal actions, but are, in fact, the actions of the 
sovereign. For the sovereign can act only through its agents, Larson, supra, at 
633, and when an agent acts for the sovereign, the suit is barred, not because 
it is against an officer of the government, but because it complains of an act 
of the sovereign. Jd_. 
In this situation, the exceptions posed in Dugan become effectively a 
restatement of the rule. In other words, the only way to determine whether the 
rule applies, is to first determine that the exceptions do not apply. A better 
method of analyzing the instant case would be, then, to first determine whether 
the action by the defendants is within their statutorily or constitutionally 
delegated authority, and, second, if the power to act has been constitutionally 
delegated to that officer, whether the power was exercised in a constitutional 
manner. If so, the act of the officer, the sovereign's agent, is an act of 
12 
those actions. 
Applying this test to the situations found'in Marbury, Larson/ and Santa 
Clara, it is clear that the results of each case may be rationally explained. 
In Marbury, the act complained of consisted of the Secretary of State denying 
a copy of a commission nn rpmrd in his office to the Plaintiff. The question 
then becomes, did the Secretary have the statutory or constitutional authority 
to deny plaintiff a copy of the commission? Since the Congress had by statute 
required the Secretary to deliver a copy of all such papers on record in his 
office to any.member of the public upon payment of a required fee, the Court 
determined that he. did not have the delegated authority to refuse a copy. Thus, 
since the sovereign had left him no discretion in the matter, his refusal became 
a personal act against which relief could be granted. 
In Larson, the Administrator was "empowered by the sovereign to administer 
a-general sales program" and as a normal outgrowth of that power of agency, was 
authorized to refuse delivery when he determined that no delivery was called for 
under a contract of sale. Larson, supra, at 692. Therefore, the Administrator's 
refusal was well within the authority delegated to him by the sovereign. Upon 
invoking the second prong of our test, we find that there was no allegation that 
the delegation of authority was not constitutionally made, or that the authority 
was not constitutionally exercised. Tc[ at 691. Thus, the Administrator's acts 
were the acts of the sovereign and the Administrator was absolutely immune from 
suit. Alternatively, in Santa Clara, the Governor of the Pueblo exercised 
3 We are compelled to note at this point, that the Administrator was not immun 
only when his refusal to deliver was in fact a correct interpretation of the 
Government's rights under the contract. Alleging a cause of action, and alleging 
an action without the sovereign's delegation of authority to the official are two 
separate and distinct propositions. "If the actions of an officer do not conflict 
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are actions of the 
sovereign whether or not (they would give rise to a private cause of action)." 
Larson, supra at 695. To hold otherwise would be to hold an officer immune only 
when he makes correct decisions and such is not the case. 
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as a member of the governing council-of the Pueblo and therefore had no individual 
authorization bv the sovereign to act in such matters. 
The appropriate test, then, as to whether *an agent of the government is 
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, consists of a two-
pronged inquiry. In each case, the act complained of, whether ommission or 
commission, must be considered to determine (1) whether the action is within the 
statutorily or constitutionally delegated authority of that agent, and (2) if so. 
whether the authority to act was exercised in an constitutional manner. This Courl 
for these purposes, finds it appropriate to adopt and a^ply the scope of authorit; 
exception to the sovereign immunity rule. 
Turning now to the facts before us, it is important'to determine the 
characteristics and status of the various defendants prior to consideration of 
che complained of action. The ultimate sovereign is clearly the people of the 
Lite Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The constitution of the Tribe 
states in the preamble: 
We, the Lite Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands 
hereafter to be known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation . . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
The Uintah and Ouray Tribal*Business Committee is the aoverning body of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation created by Article III of that 
Constitution, and is constitutionally vested with, among others, specific 
legislative, executive, administrative, and-ministerial powers of the Tribe. 
In other words, the Tribal Business Committee is the branch of the Tribal 
government to which the ultimate sovereign, the Ute people, has delegated 
certain political, discretionary, and mandatory authority necessary for the day 
to day functions of the tribal government. Constitution Article VI. 
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COiTiuittee herein complain. > h i v n i r l v" p l a i n t i f f ' s enrol lment a p p l i c a -
L i or'" »„ r.nd the i n i t i a l quest ion then becomes hhtlhtu i i •' r umstances, 
tne i i ' i uc i DLL. i'n. dmirni i ipr hn^ fh^ au tho r i t y to den}' those a p p l i c a t i o n s . 
S in re p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e a vested t o n n t i . u ^ i O I L > > . ' ' > > " the romrrittee a l lege 
ooe. » i *nnr i 'M' to d°ny1 the decis ion as to the immunity i n 
defendants becomes, in t u e c l , .i ..r i - i, n h* m e r i t s . See, Larson \L Pom ^ 
and F-o^eign Commerce Corp. , suora, at 69U. 
Defendants pr imary c o n t u . ! J r - i ' i r l r j [ of the Ute Cons t i t u t i on 
cr -p t & r ' r. c losed c lass of persons who cons t i tu ted trie i n . i d u^mh*"-'I i mf the 
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ui , c. -J u i o , . ,, f u .- > f , , . . , ic w _ ( J .p.. ^ 2 rs . - -. J * i ca L10'ns was. 
A r t . I C le i i - Membership 
Section 1. I he membership of the,Ute Indian /Tribe of tl ie.l lii ital :i ai id • 
Ouray Reservat ion sha l l cons is t as f o l l o w s : 
^ ; . . persons or i ; ,w ,^, . _.ooo wnose names appear oi i ti le 
cffic al ( s i c ) census r o i l cf the Ute Ind ian Tr ibe of tfje 
i ,: r* < nd Ouray Reservation as of th. ] , 1935. 
*
 i
 r ""• : v i * i. / ; . . *~ the Lite 1/ idian 7 r i be 
* * ray Kescrvctio: i wi . i s a res ident o f the 
K e s e r - • : . . ; r.t * t -. r : - v ' ' sa id ch i l d re i i. 
Sec;1"* ... . . .L ~ v n 1 " w i r ^ s : ' vrr; 11ce v . a l l 'have the power to promul-
cat ' i - i i n a r i c e s , s : : v f -e/ iew ty the Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r , 
c : \ w i fut i-rr- r.eniijers: : v : r < ^ - ~f new members 
U ; : o prcper t } r'tc^i:, sna i l be acquired or l o s t through 
-—'" - •
 l
 ' - - * " * • ^ on except RS p ^ v i d e d herei i i ( s i c ) 
onterr .c ncv r v s u a s i v e , 
/ ::es at l e a s t two'c lasses'"of 
fe^sc - o ^ r i u i e t v memoersnv ; v r , Wl i i le we agree tha t the 
i "" • :es a closed class of members " 
a: ;v . c e i . c . i ^ ; . w L« . - , u . , : u i u . , . ^ c t i o i ;i 1(1: >) of 'Ai t i c le I I does 
i " * - - — - 'v " c - - " L i o i i l o f A r t i c l e I I does n o t s 1: a t e 
; . . - i . ; : . ie i ^ . , : u L. '* i n i t i a : rr.eriiOe. .>;. . p , r n r does 7 t , n p v --* . fc . 
c i uTii c a n o n as LC *•" * * c.;-„.. i ' i • v- ~ s i c v c » n 
t . .= r°se*~va~~: n n - ^ ° _  , - ^eiTibe.'s.. 
p lace * v ; rh * . -W*- : .~ - \ the persons recognized a : e l - ' i c e t eT^ersni : 
t h e framers t h e r e o f knew how t o speciTica > :_• - t c e r i - i r . :ri>.L, , . 
a p p 1 i c a t i c i i o n i > See for ex amp l e , h \ I i c 1 e 11 * * *•" - ~s ui mercbe rs o * 
t h e Bus iness Coirrni t t e e ) ; A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n : - e-:.«.-.. ,.-mbe-r r* . :. 
B i J" s i i i <E s s C o n i i i 11 e e) 7 h e > d i d i \ o t d c s o / 11 1 i • • - " • - - - ^ r ^ - - e 
no l i m i t a t i o n i s s p e c i f i c a l }y placed oi i t^e ^ic , u. oerso,,^ d ; . . . . . .» -.- " 
1 (t •), n l e s t i o n i s whether t h e Business Cornr; " e e HdS b o ?n zr&r>iLC the 
members.1 ' p *f^ 
Defendant'. k^> 
r* •*• r f -, r> i i I w-? ft 
s r n i j D 
general :•*.:-* of l o q i s l a t i v e au tho r i t y in membership matters of s u f f i c i e n t 
scop? £• ' * tJiJtfi tu a l lu t i (lie L.UJ i hLiiS Loniiii ti'i i ti1 lu pi \ I! I Ii 
ef f c c t i vely prpt hfdp thp r i nh t In nipmbership for some persons w i t h i n thn class 
del i ntjtl i in in 111.1 L I I , i i 11 ui Mjppui I1 i, i iiii1 'ii I1 I, I" In'' i f e 
w . ^ .,w * * '" > , i nance: estabi :: nii \ CGrta ^  b , ns C J ^ ' J : r t-cuire-
p *- n r>' 
_ w *~J v_ , i 
the vi nerabV 
ic-aoe ';: ambigicus, ; e:ieL 
. iur 
n j . „tr * L 
n D n v , -v r 
^oarG or LCU: 
; r t l l i u L I I C 
^
 111 u: b v u s a o e, l1 -w . * 
".a 
exc „u 
r...' 
I > I h However, ever* i e p ^ d v*. 
,o r .s : i : w 
, * u c <,1 v. r i "j r.,, c c 
( : ; P r " 'Sw. ; t . See .M.s-bu^v v. Lcdison, 
I M hf"l 
Section ? r: A r t i e " ! " I I c l e a r l y places l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y in the business 
r
 nwn • ! 1 u " « | nu'in i r n n i r ,nn r P r ro re r inn future membership and the: adoption of 
new inemDers. however, t i n s delegat ion must be I L J J wntn trie companion ".'" I n'pnt " un 
Il'nnn.1 ",n A r z i r l r V1, Section 1 '' i ) l , , i r arMcV* l i s t s the delegated powers of 
the business Cor;;,ii t t e e , and bcction i 
enact r e s o l u t i o n , or ordi .ances, net incons is tent w i t h A r t i c l e I I 
of t h i s Cons t i t u t i on governing coercion a: . aoanconmenL o f members, and 
to keep a t a l l t imes a cor rec t r . -• the memoes of the Ute Indian Tr ibe 
of "t]Z l f < r J h r( i ! (M * rese rva t i on , ^-^hasis b> the Cour t ) . 
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f \ t e : : r the p-,w • •, s , cL p ^ n ^ ; t . v vu;;sl ; ^ ^ u u . , - , . . 2 
_•- *'. . Glorioett, ' ^ d. 
. : . : ^ j (1975;, ,nemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. ? r ! t . * ?, 
me object :*^ • • *' *---
 r~ *** -. - e-• 
framers (-i the Cons t i tu t ion and_to gi vv , *. 
lip fViur) hns r,oarchrri in \n * - - <">"• r ^ c o - a b l e theory upc which 
defendants ' claims wuuld l i MjbsU..L. _ - SUM< ' ' ' |> ' • » 
ufGci^.nt that defendants 1 contentions a s . t o the e f f ec t of Section 1 cf Ar t ic le 
iJ d"i t rue , Ll'"ii the men.ourJ, , H ' ,M« <finf.r' J 1 ' I < H *: of 
persons iden t i f i ed in the t sect ion there tnen e x i s t s no persons UHJ Cc n be 
^ e i ; S e 0 7 a n ordinance 
I L V - : . . ; :-,uri"r:> , j r , . r . ; ;ee es tabl i . . , , , ,c t h ° requirement 
iiiLjiiiO' fsiiiu. liiLL , Liiitnr fi^ fpnTlriri i{ ! theory,, new members may only be admitted to 
tne "in be by the process of adopt, ion. 4 
A tne n iuci Busine r ' " ^ * a c <'~ ~ un-- ir.e . : r ^ * j 
~: trie ;•:;> •, .cr. i. rev members but n r . . . 
w^ iULunsisLf ' < ;* r ~*-~i''e I*r r th-- C c n . - t i : . : . r Tne ~e-m 
>noi' .»;bL&-.t" "" oeneral * . . , . . , mi-a ' , 
,--„
 r - *• - r - - ,- n n n c i p l e s t;- p rac t :- Webster s J h f i ,. 
_ _ , J L A 1 T J W * . 
"a LT^ cr.ree cuts t a n : ,. elements " ,..- a r t i c l e : 
The term ' adop i i c r " used to denote the process by which persons can 
be admitted to membership in the Tr ibe , i s genera l ly equ iva len t to the term 
^natural ization"- -in -non-Indian-law-and practice.-—That t e rm- i s -not-used here 
to descr ibe the process by which the parent-child" r e l a t i o n s h i p i s created ii \ 
domesti c relations i a,--, 
requ ' regents f o r membership, (?x the de lec^ t i e " r f a u t h o r i t y r o toe business 
I ; ' f i ! i nilr tU i ' i! I nances cove": : '1 fu tu re membership -r.~ L;*e ? :r>~ =on' 
of ri'>w member:
 ? and (3) the rcqui^emen4 • Secretary."1 r p v ^ - ' ^ r ^ea r 
pjiri l i no I f n i > 1 i i i 11 HI H \ i i i uiq adopt i nn
 f f hr MI 1  ba S l r el ements wi t h whi ch 
such l e g i s l a t i o n could am i Ho t umld btj e i t b u i lenient I I I iiucinbei, Ih 11 M p i n r -
m ° n t r i i i ' f U'rrmt (3 I the renin i nripn4* for Secre ta r ia l review. We are onpersuaded 
I ha L the l i m i t i n g 1 a n q u a L L N t M» i i h I
 fc , ^ i ui i in I i i i MI I i 11 i l i e n n in 1 n 'n 
simplv Io provide f o r Secretar ia l review. The i l e a r ma jo r i t y of the subsections 
contained in A i t i c l e . 1 , i n I III i h i "III i i in- I 'In ' ,p-y«^( 
of 'he I n t e r i m fur ac t ion taken by the Business Conxnittee. C l e a r l y , t h i s 
lanuduO'j coul i niil h i l u m in un i ih h in i i tin1 r l i n i h i l i t y 
requirements contained in A r t i c l e 11 shouic no! oe afancgeu. tvem mint 
ilc f» Tkhiiht' " 1 n» « M in" i III i f i i» hi" inPrr» Committee would not he author ized 
by 4ne sovereign to enact and enforce l e g i s l a t i o n which p roh ib i ten a ptrson tumi 
beciTin i irnnl f m I In "i i i lc i * rurh person meet the membership requirements 
coma ined in A r t i c l e 1 1 
11
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1
 h I i nsofar as t h c blood ouantcm requirements establ ished 
by tne i i ioaT business loirrm t tee are appnea in .hu.n ij .. n1 . . ! | • 
r i o r t to membership o f ? person who meets the requirements fo ; membership 
estcDl isned JI Lri\ le I i ' I < "' i f -n i i i rp , ,«r i ' ,u ?f l i f V without 
the au tho r i t y of the sovereign and the persons apply ing sum requirements die 
ni !. e n t i L K u LL I I . ". ove1 " i un * i .in \4 \ In nth r words, the sovereion has 
decreed in the const"] t u J inn tnaL those persons meet my the reauirement i o f 
£*•* I "i i I V "h in 1 mi n ('TiqibV1 fo r membership in rn° Inb*= \ tne sovereign 
has i i j t given any agent, ui the "n ibe tne autnoi 11} LL I jmo\o I <ir iea* inr*' 
r i q l ^ and t h e r e f o r e , an\ ac t ion by an anent tn defeat tha t r i p n t i s not an 
ac t o f the sovereign but, an act i i un in i i m i i i i m i i n i leni i f h?*> 
the power ana uuLj W^ t..^w..;. 
Defendants' other assignment u vi ror J,"1 M ' I > ;< ' F l " h nnh 
df jh ' i " MI! di in 'h t fhp United States and 'he Secretary n* Ui< i n t e r i o r 
are ind ispens ib le pa r l i es immune h uih 1 hi
 %M i',» * \ n ' H " W| ' , t l | f J 
l>pr rf^ ii - \, i t1 j sniir.sr>rl hrOow Furthermore, thr« Sec re t i i } 1 . . presence is 
not necessary U- detei *.nr(c the i i . j h ' M a i h n r [^ fondants ' r o n t c n t i o n 
4
^ * 'ho 1954 1)> d i s t r i b u t i o n act requires that un'y " l u i i Muud" ulcs <s 
def ined ih the!, LLL u h i i - . r h i t 1 - ' ' rur f i / i e ^ h ' n •* negated by Section ('77(d) 
as amended v/hirh f i n a l 1 yf s t a tes , "New members hi;1 >, i h< l» ,.
 (
 , f 4
"
j p r 
be con t ro l l ed awl hi 1 ruin hi ii h ' i f ^ t i t n t i r n err! by-laws of the t r ibe and 
hrdirRnces enacted thereundei ". hcz o; August »./, i u> , i 'i , fr r>t~pt 
odd, K.i Hi /in, II " Jr-' i rh '!',.'i J. I , ?n Stst 936- i f the Congress hfid w:sred 
to l i m i t the T r ibe ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i j i n i L i u n ul nieniDors hheri l.in i i-.'lil t 1" 
e n r o l l was r evi t a l i zed in 1956, i t could have oone 
express ly . 
I • fr? n G a n *; "* r I i I r, I :vn rent ion r*> ; hat the j u r i s d i c t i o n n f t h i s Court t o hear 
and determine these appeals baie IIM.M I I ' INM mi I ! Ordinance 78-8. 
* -MC*.-I; t i ' f s have c vei:ec . , M .." e ce c . . : 
r 'On . ci • . >. ' *" ericcL-Hiw11^ r " " «.- < c -o , 
a. ' ""* r h " ""• nr-r: .=• ^ s enacted a f t e r ; , i t : -. cwLior.s were t i i t J , cppl i Cr "l i 
r* Y I U I Q U 1 *'~,n r ^ V s i o n s of the Ute Indian 
" - - r,f trie L r i c ' : r : ; Keb^; vc, ..ip °vpn , l M dri - Suwi" i 
i . 11 i' i *" t . 
IV 
V* rn-ist no* consider P l a i n t i f f s cross appeals m . i ii/im)-" 1" " 9-7E, 
and i ,o he' ' ' • '"* . , r ' [ - r l t n ° fa ; p r ( of the T r iba l Court to u*cjrd 
a t torneys fees to P l a i n t i f f s , r i a m J w s „((.•. u i i . ' t 0 r. a u t h o r i t y 
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for an ewa' 
fee: 
• • f : r , t r>! '. 
r v i H L . i i i r / l / u i u d J . i u 1 , i «. !; 
to do so. 
AFFIRMED, M l , hu OhblRLD 
Just ice [jupuis Concurs. 
This sect ion i f . inappl icable to ac t ions i n 
*• -dheres Li. Urn cer J J •„ i I I i" t t nrpPY 
(V i l i i i q p a r t v f rom the l o s i n g pai ty 
' : . ' J . :»i:: t u L e a u L i i c r i,: in 'j K>1i" i i ,,' 11 . i,.'. i1 ',!, 
uoue i V r hern brought, t o OUT a t t e n t i o n 
- i i o r n e v s tee:, IN I', • • " " ' " ^ d e c l i n e 
J u s t i c e r ;CVG r../.;vaske 
U 
SEPARATE OPINION 
Chief Justice Pi pestern concuring in part and dissenting J J " i' ' i 
*,fii nicjor 
L-cr.ia C'.ara Pueblo v Kar-inez, ^ 
-~~ IV i i tni ep n 
"•-rriing the ,ssue of soverr" 
M " stands "i i 
i-J ~ *. . u ; - w J 1 * 
i ng ress Cornniittee c l e a n s iu;ib 
witr.-'r i t s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l s 
s inmune from s u i t . Since trie T r i b a l 
,u.es the i':u ;L'. .1 i' " ' execut ive ^ ' v c 
^ irrmunity of the t r i b e insofar £c 
.IILMJ ' « "t'li' i -, the precise :T-dy w 
.u btiu the bene f i c ia ry of the immunity en: 
major 
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